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Old April 28th, 2013 #7
Alex Linder
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Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, for all his assertions that race is a social and political construct, Parekh evasively notes that: 'Some diseases disproportionately affect certain communities' (Parekh, 2000, 178), implying that this is due to cultural conditions alone. Again, despite his insistence that race is a social and political construct, Parekh bemoans the fact that: 'people from South Asia are at risk of thalassaemia' and are not offered 'genetic counselling' (Parekh, 2000, 179, emphasis added). Even advice from the British Prime Minister's Cabinet Office, cited with approval by Parekh, insists that statistics regarding illness and diseases be 'separated by race' (Parekh, 2000, 181). As Parekh acknowledges, almost all the sufferers of sickle cell disease are of African descent, and the disease is found in black populations throughout the world. Race as a social and political construct cannot account for this distribution pattern, whereas the genetic explanation is simple: the link between race and disease is medically established (Rushton, 1999). Parekh's position on race is, in his own words, 'logically incoherent'.

Parekh's main contribution to the genre of racism is the invention of 'cultural racism' (Parekh, 2000, 148). Now, if according to Parekh race is a social and political construct, that is, above all cultural in the sense that things social and political make up culture, 'cultural racism' is pure tautology and meaningless. That in itself does not make it useless, given that so much that has anything to do with anti-racism is incoherent. Placing any suitable adjective before racism frequently leads to contradiction and incoherence, but it has a wonderfully intimidating effect which weakens the will to resist in a logical manner. Therein lies the purpose of creating 'cultural racism'. The danger of arguing that race is a social and political construct is that if you attack some aspect of culture you are racist. So if you attack the practice of female circumcision you are racist or, as Parekh says later in the report, guilty of 'cultural racism'. And if should be understood that any sense of disgust, articulated or otherwise, towards such practices is itself a manifestation of cultural racism.

Free Speech and "Hate" Crime

Barely hidden and frequent attacks on free speech by trying to argue that incitement to racial hatred must be avoided are some of the more sinister aspects of The Parekh Report. This leaves plenty of room for those promoting multicultural/multiracial societies to assert that anything they do not like is somehow guilty of inciting racial hatred and thus that certain areas be barred from discussion (race as a biological and genetic reality, racial differences and IQ, immigration, for example). This attempt to censor critics becomes more important in the light of recommendation 12 of The Macpherson Report which provides a definition of a racist incident ('A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person').

An insidious attempt to set limits to certain Anglo-Saxon rights is implicit in the assertion that: 'Human rights are thus rarely absolute but can be limited in order to protect the rights of others' (Parekh, 2000, 91). Decoded, and with reference to free speech, this means, I suggest, that rights of free speech, rightly regarded as the basis of all open and free societies, should not apply to those who criticise the multicultural/multiracial experiment. Since Asian and black societies have never independently recognised the value of free speech as the basis of a free and open society or shown much respect for it in the aftermath of European colonial withdrawal, immigrants to the UK from sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent cannot reasonably be expected to grasp the importance of free speech or to defend it with the same tenacity as white Anglo-Saxons. For the indigenous whites of England and European civilization as a whole, however, a great deal is at stake. Western civilization is inconceivable and unsustainable without free speech.

'Crucially', pleads Parekh, 'restrictions on rights are legitimate only if such restrictions are proportionate to the harm they are trying to prevent' (Parekh, 2000, 91). Bearing in mind that, as far as the multicultural ideologues are concerned, racism is the great evil, then this paragraph provides a convenient basis for restricting free speech. What we have here is the typically postmodernist agenda - cloaked in the language of human rights - which asserts that any standard it wishes to destroy or subvert (in this case free speech) is relative and can claim no privileged perspective, but that any standard it wishes to enhance or to promote (multiculturalism, race is a social and political construct for example) most certainly is deemed to be a privileged perspective and thus worthy of special moral and legal status (its critics are to be silenced and vilified as racists). And if this is insufficient warning of what Western societies can increasingly expect, we should note the report's demand that human rights 'be interpreted and applied in a culturally sensitive manner' (Parekh, 2000, 91). People who attack multiculturalism, in other words, are behaving in a culturally insensitive manner and must be silenced. True enough, 'the logic of multiculturalism qualifies and informs the logic of human rights' (Parekh, 2000, 91), but it does so in a way which is inimical to logic and human rights and exposes the multicultural agenda as both illogical, deeply illiberal and, despite its assertions of inclusiveness, as monochromatic: white is second best.

Note, for example, Parekh's illogical and illiberal approach to the Human Rights Act 1998: 'Freedom of expression may assist individuals who are not allowed to wear clothing at work or school which is important to them for religious or cultural reasons' (Parekh, 2000, 97). This is, I assert, a perverse interpretation of the Act. 'Freedom of expression', as stated in the Act, has no relevance for wearing or not wearing certain items of clothing. As always, the special pleading on behalf of blacks and Asians - and in the example just noted, a perverse and illogical interpretation of the Act - is accompanied by the assertion that the rights and freedoms are not absolute and can be restricted in certain circumstances: 'Crucially, the infringement will have to be proportionate to the harm that the authority is trying to prevent' (Parekh, 2000, 97). Not specifically mentioned, I again suggest that the rights to free speech, as opposed to the right to wear unsuitable clothing at school or work, are the rights that Parekh really wishes to violate.

Hate crime, with its appropriately Orwellian ring, is another invention of multicultural ideologues who are trying to silence opposition and criminalise the thoughts and utterances of those who disagree with them. Special pleading is again evidence in the way in which Parekh characterises hate crime:

Quote:
Hate crime in general, and racist crime in particular, has a character that distinguishes it from other kinds of crime. The difference lies not only, and not primarily, in the offender's motivation, but in the greater harm done (Parekh, 2000, 127).

Last edited by Alex Linder; April 29th, 2013 at 02:42 PM.