[Alex Linder]

[this is the heart of what i wanted to post/discuss, pp 90-129; a very nice contrast of nationalism and internationalism.]

CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONALISM AND THE MAXIMUM GOOD

Discussions of good and evil presuppose a desire to secure in every case the greater good. It would be absurd to discuss a problem in order to devise means to secure the greater evil. Certainly one who should do this would be regarded as a moral degenerate. Hence has arisen the ethical postulate or moral axiom that the moral individual must always wish the greater good. As a corollary it follows that the maximum good must be the desire of the moral individual. There is little said i this axiom regarding the distribution of the good. Since, however, we are to wish always the greater good, it follows that we cannot prefer our lesser good to the greater good of others. This deduction is usually made and is clearly and unhesitatingly stated by many moralists.

This moral axiom, as pointed out above, lacks the obviousness that is supposed to be characteristic of axioms. It is not apparent that I should wish the lesser good of my friends in order that the stranger may have a greater good. Nor is it obvious that we should prefer the maximum good if it is to be possessed by a very few, granting this to be possible, at the expense of the many. As a matter of fact, moralists insist that there must be a wide distribution. They do this for two reasons. In the first place, they hold that a narrow distribution would be unjust, no matter how great the total amount. In the second place, they realize that a wide distribution is necessary to realize the greatest possible amount.

The feeling that it would be unjust to secure the maximum good of mankind by allowing a comparatively small number to possess it is not well-founded. if we should always wish the greater good, we should not cease desiring it merely because we find a limited distribution necessary to secure it. Our ideas of justice should follow this discovery; for practices and social adjustments should be considered just in the degree that they make for the maximum good. Obviously, then, there is no reason to regard a limited distribution as unjust if the greater good of man can be secured by such a distribution.

The second objection, however, to a very limited distribution is more valid. It is rightly held that the maximum good of mankind can be secured only when there is a wide distribution. Our knowledge of the nature of man convinces us of this. The capacity of a human being for any good is strictly limited. An enumeration of goods will show this clearly. When we speak of securing the maximum good of mankind, we have in mind the securing in as large amounts and in as perfect a form as possible such things or states as health, wealth, strength, love friendship, loyalty, appreciation of beauty, music, poetry, art, philosophy, mental vigor of all kinds, artistic and creative fruitfulness, well-developed personalities, pleasure, joy, and happiness. The capacity for the possession of any of these is clearly limited. Even the possession of wealth may be regarded as limited to the amount which can be used. More clearly are our capacities to receive the other goods, or to develop them limited. A man's personal relationships, mastery and appreciation of literature and art, as well as his traits of character, are strictly limited. Man is in every respect a finite being. We cannot hope to secure the maximum good mankind is capable of by a narrow distribution.

The recognition of this truth, however, often leads to an extreme position. Since the good any man can possess is very limited, and since the amount of good naturally increases as the number of the possessors of the good increase, it is held that the way to secure the maximum good of mankind is to develop fully the capacities of every man for good. Logically this is perfectly sound. It is apparent that if the capacities for good of all are fully developed, the amount of good will be greater than if only some are so developed. Hence arises the ideal of complete development for every one. The difficulties involved in the realization of this ideal are little considered. The fact that the maximum good of mankind will be served by every one enjoying good to the limit does not make this possible. in fact, a number of the goods listed seem to be incompatible with a universal extension. Leisure, opportunity for development, artistic appreciation, and creative fruitfulness, for instance, seem possible for some because others are deprived of them. In order to secure many of the goods we prize, some form of exploitation seems necessary. If this is true, it follows that instead of holding the ideal of maximum development for all, we should hold the ideal of securing the greatest amount of good possible for society as a whole. We must recognize that it is not possible for all to reach their full development, or to enjoy all the good they are capable of. This would not be possible with limitless wealth available. The full development of some means the sacrifice of the full development of others. There are large numbers of dull, stupid folks, who can develop hardly at all unless the development and capacity for enjoying the goods of life, is thwarted. Nor can we expect the goods of a rich and complex society without differences in social functions. This diversification will of necessity favor some at the expense of others. It may be unfortunate that discrimination of this sort is necessary. But without it, it is hard to see how the full development of any one can be effected. It may be possible to abolish it. Yet if we do, we may be sure that many of the goods, which at present make life full and satisfying, will be destroyed. And so it may result that in our efforts to bring about the full development of all, we make impossible the full development of any one.

Our optimism and current idealism prevent us from viewing social problems in this way. We are too convinced of the possibility of securing the full development of every one to think of making a selection of those who are to enter fully into the goods which society offers. We are confirmed in this attitude by the observation that in highly developed cultural centres the general level of intelligence, artistic appreciation, and creative fruitfulness is considerably raised. From this we infer that if every one could be interested in art, philosophy, and science, the creativeness of every one would be increased. Thus we reach the conclusion that the capacities of every one must be developed to the limit. In order to accomplish this, we set intelligent men and women, who are capable of full and rich lives, to the task of developing to the limit the capacities of the feeble-minded and others to whom life at its best can mean but little. We little realize that our blind resolution to the ideal of maximum development for all causes us to penalize the superior in order to help those not so well qualified to secure the good. If we are really anxious to secure the maximum good of man, rather than be true to certain of our pet ideals, we must recognize individual differences and stop penalizing the fit and capable in order to help the unfit. We must recognize that some individuals can receive the good much more easily than others. Above all, we must realize that many of the goods, as we conceive them, are possible only in a highly complex and diversified society, and that in such a society there must be favored and unfavored members. It should be our task to make conditions such that the ones shall be favored who seem best able to profit from the favor. It is in this way that we can hope to bring about a general uplife of society and the maximum good. These cannot be secured by favoring the inferior, no matter how much this course may be dictated by an uncritical idealism and sentimentalism.