Two excerpts from the article '100 Years of Madness':
The 1970s were a decade of political corruption. Nixon and Watergate is the primary example, but this was worldwide reality, and people started to view all politicians as lying swindlers--none too soon, we might add.
Things in the economic sector were no better: by 1977 the top 10% of the populace had an income thirty times that of the bottom 10%; the top 1% owned 33% of the wealth; and the richest 5% possessed 83% of personally owned corporate stock. Unemployment rose, and people were disgusted, which caused many to become demoralized and apathetic, feeling like nothing could be done, and limiting their political participation to voting for the lesser evil.
None of this should surprise anyone, since honest and honorable leadership has a positive effect on the majority of the populace, while poor leadership is guaranteed to produce the opposite result. Of course not everyone sat on their hands.
In National Socialist circles a man named Joe Tommasi realized that you can't beat the system at its own game. He began to discuss the armed struggle, and the need to conduct political operations in the same manner as the IRA/Sinn Fein (both legal and convert).
Tommasi put his money where his mouth was, and lived for about a year after choosing this path. During that time he had more than one or two of our enemies scared out of their skins, which just goes to show what a few dedicated individuals can accomplish (making one wonder what a few hundred serious-minded men and women might be able to achieve).
Tommasi also terrified another group: self-proclaimed white leaders. It's a fact that Hitler came to power legally. Unfortunately, this is often used as "proof" that the same thing can be done here. Vote, write your congressman, buy books, send cash, etc. People who play this nowhere game see a man like Tommasi as a dangerous boat-rocker.
They've had 25 years since Tommasi's death to show us that their way works---and they haven't managed to take a single step forward. It would be false to claim that Joe Tommasi has had the same amount of influence as Lincoln Rockwell, but it would be absolutely correct to say that National Socialism won't be going anywhere in this country until he does.
From the website of the "National Socialist Movement" (http://www.nsm88.com/
Excerpt from the article 'Leaderless Resistance' by Jeffrey Kaplan (1997):
Following the assassination of Rockwell in 1967, the party began to fragment. Matt Koehl succeeded the Commander, soon renamed the American Nazi Party the National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP), and initiated the endless round of purges that would soon cost the Party it's bare handful of capable adherents. Two of the victims of these purges and angry resignations, William Pierce and Joseph Tommasi, figure prominently in the development of the leaderless resistance concept.
Of Pierce much more will be said later. Joseph Tommasi concerns us first.
Tommasi ironically was a Koehl loyalist almost to the day he was unceremoniously purged from the NSWPP and subsequently assassinated by an NSWPP member in 1975.  Tommasi was one of the young West Coast party members whose radicalism thrilled a few and appalled the majority of American National Socialists. Addressing the Second Party Congress in 1970, his ringing call for revolutionary action NOW brought him to the attention of William Pierce--then in the throes of his own bitter dispute with Matt Koehl.
 Tommasi, like Pierce, was acutely aware of the bold actions undertaken by the Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army to name but two of the left wing combatant organizations of the day. They were determined to create a campus-based revolutionary movement of the right on the same model. Thus was born the National Socialist Liberation Front (NSLF).
In 1973 or 1974, Tommasi published his now famous poster, "THE FUTURE BELONGS TO THE FEW OF US WILLING TO GET OUR HANDS DIRTY. POLITICAL TERROR: It's the only thing they understand,
" and his seminal pamphlet, 'Building the Revolutionary Party' to announce the formation of the NSLF. The NSLF's revolutionary ideology was based on the rejection of the conservative theory of mass action which Tommasi correctly believed was paralyzing the NS movement. For Tommasi, the mass action doctrine meant in reality that no serious anti-state actions were possible given the patent impossibility of creating a mass based National Socialist party in the U.S.
Tommasi gathered some 43 adherents to the foundational meeting of the NSLF in El Monte, California, on 2 March 1974. But this number is somewhat deceiving. Few of these young National Socialists were sufficiently suicidal to act on Tommasi's rhetoric.  In the end, only 4 NSLF "members" undertook revolutionary action, Tommasi, Karl Hand, David Rust and James Mason (Mason had not officially joined the group, only receiving his membership card after Tommasi's assassination). As James Mason recalls:
Yes, the N.S.L.F. of Tommasi had four persons who carried out the illegal activities. The remainder, the majority, weren't that much different from the N.S.W.P.P. members except they were a lot more forward thinking. 
The NSLF soldiered on at least in name for another decade. In that time however, Tommasi was murdered, Hand and Rust were incarcerated for acts of racially motivated violence and firearms charges, and James Mason found a new avatar in Charles Manson. But the NSLF's contribution to the leaderless resistance concept is incalculable. 
The NSLF was the first to act on the theory that, regardless of the dearth of public support, a blow could be struck against the hated state, provided that the determined revolutionary was prepared to act resolutely and alone.
Tommasi was among the first to fully grasp the truth of the strategic situation--in the milieu of the radical right, no one is to be trusted, anyone could be (and probably is) an informer for the government or for one of the many watchdog organizations monitoring radical right wing activity, and short of divine intervention, public support would not be forthcoming no matter what tactical approach the movement was to adopt.
Yet in this state of weakness, there is ultimate strength. With nothing left to lose, a man is totally free to act as he will. For while the state had proven over and over again that it could effortlessly penetrate any right wing organization, it had yet to develop the capability to thwart the will of one man acting alone!
This revelation would do the NSLF little good. The group actually died with Tommasi.  The actions of Hand and Rust were in reality pathetic outbursts of pointless violence which succeeded only in bringing them into the care of the state's prison system. But the example, once proffered, could not be erased. Although it had yet to be given a name, leaderless resistance was born.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the conservative majority of the far right did not approve of the unauthorized actions of leaderless resistors. Their well grounded fear was of precisely the sort of pointless and undisciplined actions which landed the tiny NSLF combatant cadre in prison.
Rather, between mass action's impotent dreams and leaderless resistance's antinomian reality, there was a third path which would become a model for the more extreme fringes of the present day militia movement. Borrowed from Leninist theory, the cell structure under a centralized command was the mark of the 1960s era Minutemen under the leadership of Robert Bolivar DePugh. R.N. Taylor recalls of these days:
The Minutemen never advocated leaderless resistance "per se." In fact where such did occur, where an individual or small group, did in fact take some action on their own, it was generally a cause for concern and created trouble for the National organization. We did our very best to maintain a certain discipline among the members.
Originally the structure of organization was in "bands" [that] pretty well conformed to the classic guerrilla band of from 6 to 12 people. Later for security reasons, we began to reorganize along the lines of "cells" of three people. When all the members, in a geographical proximity to one another had been made a part of a cell, then we instituted a dispersed cell system for members who lived at too great a distance from other members. Where three people from 500 or more miles apart would be members of a dispersed team.
This was on the understanding that, if directed to do so, they would all meet at a given time and place. When they had fulfilled whatever function they were called upon to accomplish, they all would then return to their respective locations. Only one of the three would even know the identity of the other two members, and that party would be the only one directly in touch with the National Organization.
This is like an underground or resistance war type of structure. In addition to these modes of organization, the national organization had what they termed the "Defense Survival Force."
The DSF was a group of inner core members who had expertise and training in such skills as surreptitious entry, lock-picking, electronic eavesdropping and proficiency in weapons, tactics and all else that might apply to specialized para-military operations.
The DSF to my knowledge never consisted of more than 50 members. This small sector were of course under control of the National Organization. There was nothing spontaneous or thrill of the moment about this inner corps' activities. So, from the very beginning the Minuteman Organization was always attempting to maintain leadership and some sense of discipline and restraint among it's members. 
The decade which followed Tommasi's death and the fall of the NSLF were, from the perspective of the far right, both eventful and deeply disheartening. Most notable, a true revolutionary movement, the "Silent Brotherhood,"
more popularly known as "the Order,"
under the leadership of Robert Mathews arose and after a brief but incandescent revolutionary career, was smashed by the state. It was not until the Order was nearing its inglorious end that many in the radical right were able to accept that the group could be anything other than a diabolically clever federal entrapment scheme. 
Interview with James Mason, 28 November 1996.
On the meeting, and for reprints of Tommasi's writings, see James Mason, 'Siege' (Denver, CO: Storm Books, 1992). On the formation of the NSLF, letter from James Mason, 16 December 1996.
Letter from James Mason, 16 December 1996. Mason was responding to the suggestion that this core/peripheral membership was at the root of differing claims by Tommasi of the level that NSLF support was either more than 40 or only 4.
One such contribution is provided by the special double issue of the NSLF's newsletter which offered a--how to' manual for those seeking to organize their own NS combatant organizations. See Karl Hand, 'Special Double Issue: How to Organize a Local Unit,' 'National Socialist Observer' (February & March 1985).
James Mason, 'Siege,' p. 104. Interview with James Mason, 28 November 1996.
Interview with R. N. Taylor, 11 June 1997. Even today, however, Taylor does not completely discount the utility of the leaderless resistance concept, given the unlikely possibility that the right person may emerge to carry on the fight: As for it's (leaderless resistance's) effect on "demonstrating resistance-however doomed it might appear."
This might be the case, and perhaps the only case in which something effective would be accomplished. It brings to mind the Catalan Nationalist, Francisco Sabata, who conducted a one-man guerrilla war against Franco's government, for decades. He became something of a mythic Robin Hood figure in Spain. I'm sure his activities and the publicity generated by them, helped to serve as a sort of torch or beacon. What made Sabata the legend he was? I'm sure it was based on his daring, his determination and flair. He wasn't a madman, he wasn't a pervert--he was an idealistic patriot and nationalist of the highest order. So, if someone like that were to conduct some one man war, it might well capture the popular imagination. But nothing less than that.
On the Order, see Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, 'The Silent Brotherhood' (New York: Signet, 1990). On the movement's suspicion of the Order as a federal government sting operation see Rick Cooper, 'Warning,' NSV Report (Jul/Sep 1984), p. 6. Too late, Cooper would realize his mistake and publish a eulogy to the Order. See NSV Report (Apr/Jun 1985), pp. 1-5.