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Old August 8th, 2013 #1
Alex Linder
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This from book called "Nationalism and Liberty," by Hans Kohn, 1956, reprinted by Greenwood Press (which prints a lot of conservative social-policy books) in 1978. Book is about Switzerland.

Premise is that something akin to Swiss cantons, but on a continental scale, is best for Americans.

In the fifteenth century the Swiss cantons represented a great military power, which participated decisively in the European wars of the period. Their loose alliance, however, was not strong enough to support a great power policy of warfare and expansion; the cantons were not willing to sacrifice their liberties and their independence on the altar of centralization and efficiency. They preferred, as a modern historian puts it, their own way of life, which they regarded as their freedom, to the lures of power.

The Swiss had a true confederacy - there was no Washington, D.C., dictating to the cantons, rendering them meaningless. Basically the cantons formed a defensive alliance against outside powers, but within their own territories did things in very different ways. So there was no centrally enforced uniformity.
 
Old August 11th, 2013 #2
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The author is a jew. What's his stance? Is the book worth reading? Thanks.
 
Old August 11th, 2013 #3
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Originally Posted by Pierre-Marc View Post
The author is a jew. What's his stance? Is the book worth reading? Thanks.
Yes, it's short, only 133 pages. There were a number of things I hadn't realized, such as the fact that Switzerland, although its confederation is very old, went through a number of different changes, was influenced, in the 1800s, by the American constitution.

The basic trick is to create a nation, with necessary national forms and institutions, without destroying the cantons, the component parts, which are the independent nations which came together in the first place to form the confederation. This is a very difficult thing to do. Switzerland may be the one place on earth that managed it pretty successfully. My view is that something like this could be arranged in North America: multiple white states forming a confederation for racial defensive purposes. Besides race, whites forming this state could go their own way on economics and the rest, since whites don't agree on these things. Hell, whites don't agree on race, but Whites do. But that disagreement is too profound to be compromised on, since the mongrelists have proved unwilling to let the Whites go their own way - i.e. by rescinding Constitutionally guaranteed right of free association.

What the book also shows is that you need a good deal of quality people to pull off a Confederation over time, because there will be all kinds of difficulties, both internal and external, that will threaten to rip it apart. Factions will get angry, you need calm, mature people to create the kind of compromises that preserve the basic order.
 
Old August 11th, 2013 #4
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Thanks, I'll try to find this book.

Nowadays, all major political parties except the SVP are trying to diminish the power that the cantons have. The cultural and political differences between the cantons are of course an obstacle to their globalization.
 
Old August 11th, 2013 #5
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Thanks, I'll try to find this book.

Nowadays, all major political parties except the SVP are trying to diminish the power that the cantons have. The cultural and political differences between the cantons are of course an obstacle to their globalization.
Yes, that spirit is strong in this age - centralizing and dictating. It can only be resisted by those who jealously cling to their own power, their own rights, their own prerogatives. For example, in the US, states can interpose themselves, or nullify anything the feds do that they consider unconstitutional. In theory, anyway, they can do this. In practice, they almost never do, although occasionally they threaten. Why? Because they don't have the balls. Because the media will come down on them relentlessly. Ultimately, someone has to assert power against the central state or it will never stay in its bounds. Decades of public schooling and media brainwashing make it difficult to produce this kind of man.
 
Old August 11th, 2013 #6
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Thanks, I'll try to find this book.

Nowadays, all major political parties except the SVP are trying to diminish the power that the cantons have. The cultural and political differences between the cantons are of course an obstacle to their globalization.
I'm not saying it's any kind of great book, it's just a quickly read overview. But useful for someone like me who knows little about Swiss history. After reading this book, I get the basic idea:

- 3 little rural peasant cantons came together to forum a defensive alliance

This is the origin of Switzerland, and eventually it accreted into 22 cantons. The cantons, for most of Swiss history, have been stronger than the nation, which was more of a thing on paper, an occasional meeting of delegates from the canton-nations, rather than a genuine thing in itself. Switzerland was an alliance, a confederation, not a nation, for most of its history. This book emphasizes how vastly different these little cantons actually were - that's what's so remarkable, that Switzerland could bring this diversity or variety of customs and practices and languages and religions under the same umbrella. That is what is unique and instructive about Switzerland and its history.

Napoleon came in and changed things, somewhat. Switzerland, with a good 500 years behind it, roughly 1290 to 1800, did finally become a real nation - but more in the sense of adding stuff to the cantonal freedom and independence rather than at the price of it. Some internal restrictions or inefficiences were removed, some feeling of Swiss nationalism were stimulated by writers and poets, but not at the cost of the federalism.

Today, Switzerland is still what it once was, in the main, but it comes under, for that very reason, pressure from the globalizers, the one-worlders, the NWO crew, the judeo-bolsheviks. So that every time it tries to do something rational in defense of its people it is attacked by the global Zionist press. Typically this is something related to kicking out illegal aliens or restricting their movement or impeding their road to citizenship. The Swiss will have to fight hard to keep their cantonal integrity, and the media will be 100% against them and on the side of their native centralizers and foreign invaders.

Last edited by Alex Linder; August 11th, 2013 at 10:02 AM.
 
Old August 19th, 2013 #7
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The myth of Weimar Europe

Cas Mudde - 19 August 2013

The over-hyped generalisation of a few high-profile cases has obscured the fact that the vast majority of EU countries have electorally and politically marginal populist radical right parties

Since the start of the Great Recession, the US subprime mortgage market crash that turned into a global economic crisis, it has become received wisdom that the far right is on the rise. How else could it be? Since the rise of the Nazis in Weimar Germany conventional wisdom holds that economic crises breed far right success. [conventional wisdom = leftist dogma] While there is no really elaborate academic theory underlying it, the economic-crisis-breeds-extremism thesis might be one of the most popular social science theories out there today (together with the closely related modernisation theory). It is received wisdom among academics, journalists, and policymakers alike. [like those are different classes, rather than one closed shop]

The idea that the Great Recession fuelled a resurgence of far right, i.e. both radical and extreme right parties, is based mostly on two highly publicised cases, both in 2012: the National Front (FN) in France and Golden Dawn in Greece. Having finally replaced her father, party founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen took the FN as a phoenix from her ashes. After years of electoral decline, she led the party to its best ever results in the presidential and second best ever results in the parliamentary election of 2012. Even more shocking were the two Greek parliamentary elections in May and June 2012, which saw the entrance of the, until then marginal, neo-Nazi Golden Dawn into the Greek parliament. While many radical right parties have entered national legislatures since 1980, this was the first time that an openly extreme right party was able to pull it off. [putting your own country ahead of jews and illegal aliens is "extremism" in the zionist controlled media] For most observers, academic and non-academic, these two cases were symptomatic for the rise of the far right in Europe, the expected result of the economic crisis.

An analysis of the recent electoral results of far right parties in EU member states shows a very different picture, however. If we compare the pre-crisis (2005-2008) with the crisis (2009-2013) results, the striking lack of electoral success of the far right stands out most. First of all, more than one quarter, eight of the twenty-eight, current EU member states have no far right party to speak of. Interestingly, this includes four of the five bailout countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain); Greece being the only exception. Second, among the twenty countries with (somewhat) relevant far right parties, the electoral results are almost evenly split: eleven have seen an increase in electoral support for far rights parties during the period 2005-2013, and nine have not. Third, of the eleven countries with rising far right support, only five saw more or less sizeable increases in absolute (rather than relative) terms. However, against these five countries in which far right parties gained more than five percent of the vote between 2005 and 2013, stand three countries that saw a decrease by more than five percent (Belgium, Romania and Slovakia).

The five EU countries that have seen a substantial rise of populist radical right electoral support are Austria (+13.1%), Finland (+14.9%), France (+9.3%), Hungary (+14.5%), and Latvia (+6.9%). Greece comes close (+4.7%), almost doubling its support, and will be discussed separately below. The single biggest increase is in Finland, where the True Finns jumped from 4.1 percent in 2007 to 19.0 percent in 2011. Interestingly, Finland was among the least affected EU countries, having faced its own economic crisis over a decade before the Great Recession. This notwithstanding, the economic crisis played a major role in the electoral campaign and success of the True Finns (PS), which vehemently opposed the bailouts. That said, the populist radical right status of the party is heavily debated, and it seems at best a borderline case. [This shows that nationalism is not mainly or merely a function of bad times, but the normal preference of average people]

The other two West European countries, Austria and France, have both suffered rather moderate economic distress, unlike the two East European countries (Hungary and Latvia). And while there is no doubt that the parties have profited from political dissatisfaction related to the economic crisis, both the FN and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) are established populist radical right parties, which have gained similar electoral results well before the crisis started (1997 and 1999, respectively). This leaves Hungary and Latvia, two of the hardest-hit countries in the former East, which as a region has not born the brunt of the Great Recession.

The rise of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) has received significant academic and public attention, although it sometimes takes a backseat to the troubling policies of Premier Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government. Jobbik won a staggering 16.7 percent of the vote in its first elections in 2010, replacing the marginal Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) as the country’s premier populist radical right party. This was the second biggest increase after Finland. But where the True Finns might be too moderate to be considered populist radical right, Jobbik might be too extreme. It walks a fine line between radical right and extreme right, in part represented by the political party (Jobbik) and the paramilitary movement (Hungarian Guard). Although Hungary has been extremely hard hit by the economic crisis, and has been flirting with a bailout, the 2010 elections were not really thought over the Great Recession. While both Fidesz and Jobbik profited from widespread political dissatisfaction, its cause was partly economic (i.e. the economic crisis), partly political (i.e. the Gyurcsány scandal).

The most pure case of the economic crisis theory seems, oddly enough, the tiny and little noticed Baltic country of Latvia. Hit extremely hard by the banking crisis, Paul Krugman called Latvia “the new Argentina” in 2008. The fact that the populist radical right National Alliance (NA) has practically doubled its electoral support between 2006 and 2011 should therefore surprise no one. Moreover, following the Weimar scenario even more perfectly, the NA joined the Latvian government in 2011, although as a junior coalition partner. The puzzling aspect is, however, that the rise of the NA took place in 2011, after the peak of the economic crisis. While the economy nosedived in 2008-2009, the NA gained a mere 0.7 percent in the 2010 elections (compared to 2006). Yet, after the economy stabilised in 2010, the party jumped from 7.7 to 13.9 percent in the 2011 elections. That year, the Latvian economy showed a real GDP growth of 5.5 percent.

The danger of far right sensationalism

In short, the numbers simply don’t add up. Despite all the talk of the rise of the far right as a consequence of the Great Recession, the sober fact is that far right parties have gained support in only eleven of the twenty-eight EU member states (39%), and increased their support substantially in a mere five (18%). Just as was the case during the Great Depression, i.e. Weimar Germany (and to a lesser extent Italy), the unfounded generalisation of a few high-profile cases (i.e. France and Greece) has obscured the fact that the vast majority of EU countries have electorally and politically marginal populist radical right parties, both before and during the Great Recession. At the end of 2013, only about half of EU member states have a populist radical right in their national parliament, and only two in their national government, as junior partners (Bulgaria and Latvia).

This is not to say that the far right is irrelevant in contemporary Europe, or that the situation in Greece is not extremely troubling. Rather, it is a warning against selective perception and sensationalist generalisations as well as a call for keeping our eye on the real political threats of today. Throughout Europe politicians use the alleged threat of a far right resurgence, backed by the economic crisis thesis, to push through illiberal policies. A relatively moderate example is Greek premier Antonis Samaras’ increasing support for tough discourse on immigration and immigrants. An extreme example is Hungarian premier Orbán’s frontal attack on the country constitutional order. Both have defended their actions as necessary in the wake of mounting far right pressures, presenting their governments as the only realistic alternative to the far right hordes. And although both countries are indeed confronted with a particularly dangerous far right opposition, which is truly anti-democratic, neither party is even close to gaining political power.

In short, Europe is not at the brink of a Weimar Germany scenario. In sharp contrast to the situation in Weimar Germany in the early 20th century, extremists are relatively minor political players in the Europe of the early 21st century. Even more importantly, whereas the Weimar Republic was a democracy without democrats, democracy is hegemonic in contemporary Europe. It is important that Europeans remain vigilant toward the far right, but they should not get paralyzed by an irrational fear, which can turn them into the uncritical masses of opportunistic and power-hungry ‘democratic’ political leaders.

Cas Mudde is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Georgia. He is the author of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (2007) and co-editor of Populism in Europe and Latin America: Corrective or Threat for Democracy? (2012)

http://www.policy-network.net/pno_de...-Weimar-Europe
 
Old June 10th, 2014 #8
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Neocons at Open Democracy about supposed Western Euro nationalist ties to Kremlin


The Kremlin’s marriage of convenience with the European far right

Anton Shekhovtsov 28 April 2014

Putin’s strong-arm tactics in Eastern Ukraine and ‘moral, family-based’ policies have won him ardent support from far-right European groups. But they should not be under any illusions...на русском языке

For its massive information war waged against the Euromaidan protests and the consequent revolution that has toppled the authoritarian regime of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, the Kremlin presumably mobilised all its lobbying networks in the West. This revealed what experts have long suspected, namely that today’s European extreme right parties and organisations are the most ardent supporters of Putin’s political agenda.


Moscow money talks

Crimea, 16 March. Here they are: international ‘observers’ at the illegal and illegitimate ‘referendum’ held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea occupied by the Russian ‘little green men.’ The overwhelming majority of the ‘observers’ are representatives of a broad spectrum of European extreme-right parties and organisations: Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei (FPÖ) and Bündnis Zukunft, Belgian Vlaams Belang and Parti Communautaire National-Européen, Bulgarian Ataka, French Front National, Hungarian Jobbik, Italian Lega Nord and Fiamma Tricolore, Polish Samoobrona, Serbian ‘Dveri’ movement, Spanish Plataforma per Catalunya. They were invited to legitimise the ‘referendum’ by the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy & Elections (EODE) – a smart name for an ‘international NGO’ founded and headed by Belgian neo-Nazi Luc Michel, a loyal follower of Belgian convicted war-time collaborationist and neo-Nazi Jean-François Thiriart. Presented by Michel as ‘a non-aligned NGO’, the EODE does not conceal its anti-Westernism and loyalty to Putin, and is always there to put a stamp of ‘legitimacy’ on all illegitimate political developments, whether in Crimea, Transnistria, South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Moscow’s money talks.

Yet the EODE is only a drop in the ocean of extensive co-operation between the Kremlin and the European far right. Front National’s Marine Le Pen now visits Moscow on a seemingly regular basis: in August 2013 and April 2014 she had meetings with Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and Speaker of the Russian parliament Sergey Naryshkin. Le Pen’s adviser on geopolitical matters Aymeric Chauprade participated, as an ‘expert’, in the meeting of the Committee for Family, Women and Children Issues in the Russian parliament to endorse the laws banning adoption of Russian orphan children by LGBT couples. Several former members of the Front National run ProRussia.TV, an extension of the Kremlin’s international PR instruments such as Russia Today and the Voice of Russia.



The Paris-based, Russian Institute of Democracy and Co-operation (yet another smart name) co-organised a conference in Leipzig on ‘family issues’, featuring speakers such as Thilo Sarrazin who is known for his attacks on multiculturalism, Jürgen Elsässer, chief editor of the far-right Compact magazine, and Frauke Petry, a spokesperson of the Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland.

Jobbik’s leader Gábor Vona gave a lecture at Moscow State University at the invitation of Russian right-wing extremist Aleksandr Dugin; according to Vona, it would be better for Hungary to leave the EU and join the Russia-dominated Eurasian Union. Dugin himself gave a talk in the United Kingdom at the invitation of the far-right Traditional Britain Group and wrote a letter of support to Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the now jailed leader of the Greek neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, whose political programme urges Greek society to turn away from ‘American Zionists’ and ‘Western usury’ towards Russia. Just a few days ago, Bulgarian Ataka’s leader Volen Siderov launched his party’s European election campaign in Moscow.

The list of the instances of the Kremlin’s co-operation with the European far right could be continued, but it seems more important to discuss the underlying motifs of this co-operation as well as the dangers that this co-operation poses to European democracy.

European extreme right perspectives

First of all, the European extreme right parties and organisations respect the Kremlin for its might and vigour. In his manifesto, the notorious Norwegian mass murderer and terrorist Anders Breivik called Putin ‘a fair and resolute leader worthy of respect’. Italian far-right Forza Nuova salutes Putin’s Russia as ‘a new beacon of civilisation, identity and courage for other European peoples.’ FPÖ’s Andreas Mölzer hails Putin as a hero who ‘has managed to steer the post-Communist, crisis-ridden Russia into calmer waters.’ For the European extreme right, Putin is a powerful leader, who has challenged the political status quo of the West and has questioned the global role of the US, which the European extreme right openly loathe. The allegedly anti-globalist agenda of the Kremlin – which, in reality, is a concealed attempt at seizing and securing the position of the global superpower for Russia itself – attracts the European far left too, especially in Germany, France, Greece, Portugal and the Czech Republic.

Russia’s rise as an anti-Western power is seen by the European extreme right as an amazing example of national sovereignty and self-determination. These ideas are most prominent in today’s Eurosceptic rhetoric of the extreme right parties based in the EU, ‘a technocratic monster that only serves the interests of bankers’ (Le Pen), from which, according to Geert Wilders of the Dutch far right Partij voor de Vrijheid, European nation-states should ‘liberate’ themselves. Forza Nuova even calls upon Putin to destroy ‘the Europe of technocrats.’

European neutrality, which verges on national isolationism as the logical consequence of self-determination driven to extremity, is also a popular idea among the European extreme right. It serves as a euphemistic argument in favour of ‘Fortress Europe’ and justifies non-interference in international matters outside Europe. Moscow’s smart trick that prevented the US military from crushing Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime was celebrated across the broad extreme right spectrum. Preventing the West from stopping the most brutal regimes is presented as promoting multipolarity, but this multipolarity is a sham: its only aim is to undermine democracy globally. In Putin’s Russia, European right-wing extremists see a force that can indeed hamper the world’s democratic development. Less global democracy means less global security, and weakened global security may be interpreted as an excuse for enforcing the anti-immigration agenda.

Russia’s authoritarian conservatism is yet another source of attraction for the European extreme right that consider Russia a country where ‘traditional’, ‘family’ and ‘Christian values’ have triumphed. For Jobbik’s Vona, Russia is ‘a better Europe’ because it ‘preserves its traditions and does not follow the culture of money and the masses’. Russia’s anti-gay laws, in particular, were a hit among many European ultranationalists, especially in France and in Italy, where the far-right Fronte Nazionale expressed its support for Putin’s ‘courageous position against the powerful gay lobby’ (as well as anti-EU and pro-Assad stances) through dozens of posters in Rome.

On a more prosaic note, European right-wing extremists seem to benefit financially from their co-operation with the Kremlin. While no direct evidence exists that the Kremlin provides financial support to its extremist allies in the EU, it would be ridiculous to suggest that they are not paid for their lobbying services – and the extreme right are indeed engaged in lobbying Russia’s interests in the EU.

Kremlin perspectives

Putin’s Russia is a far-right political system characterised by authoritarianism, nationalism and populism – all these characteristics are intrinsic to the European extreme right, so co-operation between them seems like a natural process. Obviously, there are differences between the European extreme right parties – they differ in their radicalism and positions on particular issues. The Front National may be willing to co-operate with the Partij voor de Vrijheid or FPÖ, but not with Jobbik or Ataka. Even in one national context, far-right parties may be unfriendly to each other, so, for example, it is hard to imagine any fruitful co-operation between Italy’s Fiamma Tricolore and Forza Nuova. However, Putin’s far-right government is eager to co-operate with any European ultranationalist party unless it is critical of Russia for historical or other reasons. Thus, the ideological affinity between Putin’s regime and European extreme right parties is one reason for their co-operation.


Second, as the ideological approach of the majority of the European ‘observers’ at the Crimean ‘referendum’ demonstrated, right-wing extremists are the main pool of EU-based politicians who can legitimise Russian actions domestically and internationally. When reporting on the work of the international ‘observers’, the Russian state media never mentioned their ideological positions. On the contrary, they were presented in a boringly neutral way: FPÖ’s Johann Gudenus was simply ‘an MP from Austria’, Front National’s Aymeric Chauprade – ‘a political scientist’, neo-Nazi Enrique Ravello – ‘an observer from Catalunya’, etc. These trivial representations were needed to reassure the Russian audience that the Crimean ‘referendum’ was perfectly legitimate. The European Parliament said it was not? Well, there were members of EU-based parties, among them MEPs, who concluded that it was.

Internationally, too, extreme-right politicians were always most supportive of Putin’s actions. Who praised Putin’s Russia – after ‘observing’ the unfair parliamentary elections in Russia in 2011 – for having ‘a robust, transparent and properly democratic system?’ Nick Griffin, MEP and leader of the extreme-right British National Party. In this sense, the European right are a magic talking mirror from Brothers Grimm’s Snow White, always ready to confirm the fairness of the Evil Queen.

Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party, as an observer at the 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia.

In 2013-2014, European right-wing extremists were the most vocal in defending the Russian interference in and, later, invasion of Ukraine. They did not even have to convince the international audience fully of the legitimacy of the Russian actions; they only needed to contribute to the disruption of the narrative of the overwhelming majority of democratic leaders and major international organisations that condemned Putin’s actions.

Third, despite the far-right nature of Putin’s regime, it is only a façade hiding a corrupt, self-serving and elitist system, for which cooperation with the European far right is one of the means of furthering and securing its business interests in the West. In his most recent book (‘System of the Russian Federation in the war of 2014’), Gleb Pavlovsky argues that there are two authorities in Putin’s Russia. One is the actual, visible state that is very weak with deliberately inefficient political and administrative institutions; the other is a parallel state, or what Pavlovsky terms the ‘RF System’. The latter has secured absolute power in Russia, but it cannot operate openly because it is straightforwardly unfair and corrupt. Because of this, the ‘RF System’ needs the weak actual state to hide its activities. As Ivan Krastev wrote, ‘Russia clearly has elections, but no rotation of power. [...] In the Russian system elections are used as the way to legitimise the lack of rotation’. As the Russian parliament is virtually a rubber-stamp assembly (‘the parliament is not a place for discussions‘) for legalising the decisions of the parallel state, so Russian nationalism, social conservatism and populism – for the ‘RF system’ – are just instruments for controlling society by feeding its prejudices and phobias.


In the European context, Putin’s Russia uses the extreme right also as tools to undermine and weaken EU political institutions. Stronger EU institutions restrain the Kremlin’s westward corrupting advance in terms of economy, politics and international relations. The strong democratic West is eventually the only obstruction to Putin making Russia the global superpower. Since Russia is unable to win over the West by fair-and-square competition, i.e. by advancing economy, technology, culture, human capital, etc., it can only become the superpower by weakening other actors. Consolidated democracy and good governance, seen as the essential prerequisite for the West’s economic prosperity, are, therefore, one of the first targets for the ‘RF System’. The inherently anti-democratic extreme right (and extreme left) are, thus, natural allies of Putin in his anti-democratic crusade against the EU. Although there is no reason to idealise EU mainstream parties, they are less prone to corruption than the extreme right, or – looking at Germany’s former social democrat chancellor Gerhard Schröder, now the chairman of the board of Nord Stream AG and a top lobbyist for the Kremlin – the extreme right may simply be less expensive to corrupt.

Gas politics

As oil and gas revenues account for more than 50% of Russia’s federal budget, the Kremlin needs to secure its position as a major supplier of gas to the EU. The map of South Stream, a planned gas pipeline to transport Russian gas – deliberately avoiding Ukraine – to the EU, shows that every country on the route has either a pro-Russian government or a far-right party represented in parliament and openly pro-Kremlin: Bulgaria (pro-Russian government, Ataka), Serbia (pro-Russian government), Hungary (Jobbik), Austria (FPÖ, BZÖ), Greece (Golden Dawn), Italy (Lega Nord). The only exception is Slovenia where the far-right Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka is insignificant, and the current political establishment is democratic and pro-EU. Given the cooperation between the Kremlin and the European extreme right, it is no wonder that, for example, Jobbik prefers the South Stream pipeline to Nabucco, another planned gas pipeline aimed at reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian energy.



Map of the South Stream route in Europe


The Kremlin’s cooperation with the European extreme right, while reflecting the ideological affinity between the two parties, is a marriage of convenience for Putin who would be ready to dump his partners when he no longer needs them to implement his political and economic agenda. The Kremlin’s ‘ideal version’ of the EU is not a homogeneously white, pious, socially conservative union, but more of a corrupt, ‘Berlusconized’ Europe or, even better, a corrupt, ‘Bulgarianised’ Europe. In 2008, Russia’s then Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin called Bulgaria ‘Russia’s Trojan horse in the EU’; it was recently described by President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso as a country where some elements of political establishment ‘are agents of Russia.’

The Kremlin needs continuously to attach and re-attach Western countries by permeating their economies with Russian (clean or dirty) money, in order to reach the point where Russia, as a business partner of the West, would be ‘too big to fail.’ In this situation, the democratic consensus of the West – in the face of Putin’s anti-democratic crusade – would be shattered by pragmatic considerations. This is why the corruptible, Eurosceptic and anti-democratic nature of the extreme-right parties is more important to the Kremlin than their racism and ultra-conservatism. Today, the far right (and the far left) seem to be the most convenient partners for Putin. The European elections in May will make clear how far Putin will have advanced towards his goal of corrupting and weakening the EU.


http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russ...pean-far-right
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Old February 18th, 2015 #9
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Europe’s far right still loves Putin

Relations between Moscow and the West are at a post-Cold War low, but Vladimir Putin has vocal allies, particularly among Europe's resurgent far right.


Russian President Vladimir Putin is, for many critics of the European establishment, an appealing counterpoint to the piety and dogmas of western liberal democracy.

By:Ishaan TharoorThe Washington Post, Published on Wed Feb 18 2015

WASHINGTON—Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s anti-immigrant National Front, is a politician on the rise. According to a recent survey, the far-right Le Pen would come out on top if polls for France’s 2017 presidential election were held today.


Her popularity is a mark both of increasing French frustration with the political status quo as well as of Le Pen’s own efforts to bring her notoriously xenophobic (some would say neo-fascist) party closer to the French mainstream.


Yet there are many contexts where Le Pen remains at odds with Europe’s liberal consensus. One glaring case in point has to do with the continent’s current bogeyman: Russian President Vladimir Putin.


Relations between Moscow and the West are at a post-Cold War low, frayed by Putin’s power play in Ukraine, where thousands have died during a year of clashes between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian government forces. But Putin has vocal allies in the West, particularly among Europe’s resurgent far right.


Speaking to a Polish radio station this week, Le Pen took Putin’s side in the conflict, hailing Russia as “a natural ally of Europe.” She said Moscow’s annexation of Crimea last March ought to be recognized by European governments, stressing that the interim government in Kyiv at the time “was illegal.” She trotted out the Kremlin’s talking points on the nature of the revolt that ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych last year, branding the movement as one organized by “neo-Nazi militants.”


Never mind the irony of a far-right European politician warning against neo-Nazism. Le Pen repeated claims she has made for almost a year now that Europe, when it comes to Ukraine, is behaving “like American lackeys.” Le Pen sounded the gong again earlier this month: “The aim of the Americans is to start a war in Europe to push NATO to the Russian border,” she said.


Le Pen is hardly alone in her admiration for Russia under Putin. A whole range of right-wing and ultra-nationalist European politicians share her affection for the Russian leader, whose religious nationalism, conservative values and stated discomfort with the U.S.-authored geopolitical order all appeal to their own brand of politics.


To be sure, Putin has his backers among Europe’s hard left as well, including within the government of newly elected Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. As an article in the Guardian noted this week, the Euroskeptic far right and hard left in effect give Putin a sizable bloc of support in Brussels — roughly more than a quarter of the seats in the European Parliament.




Part of this is down to political affinity — Putin is, for many critics of the European establishment, an appealing counterpoint to the piety and dogmas of western liberal democracy. Elsewhere, populists and wannabe strongmen all look up to the example set by the Russian president. But, as the Guardian reports, it also has to do with money.


Le Pen’s National Front admitted it received a $10-million (U.S.) loan last year from a Russian bank. A web of far-right politicians in Europe have received some form of patronage from figures within Putin’s camp, including a wealthy oligarch. In former eastern bloc countries like Hungary, Russian largesse is playing an increasingly prominent role in shaping both the nation’s economy and its politics.


“It’s beyond irony,” a senior figure in the European Commission in Brussels tells the Guardian. “You can hear Putin say he had to act in Ukraine to stop fascism, while he’s financing fascists right, left, and centre all over Europe.”


Tharoor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. He previously was a senior editor at TIME, based first in Hong Kong and later in New York.

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/20...ves-putin.html
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Old March 10th, 2015 #10
Robbie Key
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10 March 2015

The far right "International Russian Conservative Forum" to take place in Russia

The Russian fascist Rodina (Motherland) party that was founded by Russia's current Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin is organising a large conference titled "International Russian Conservative Forum" (IRCF) to be held in St. Petersburg on 22 March 2015.



According to Kommersant's journalist Grigory Tumanov, the following European organisations are taking part in the conference:

1. Attack (Ataka), Bulgaria.
2. Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), Austria.
3. Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka), Serbia.
4. Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF).

The APF is a newly established umbrella organisation that was established in Rome on 4 February 2015 and is represented by the following parties:

1. New Force (Forza Nuova), Italy.
2. National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), Germany.
3. Party of the Swedes (Svenskarnas parti), Sweden.
4. Golden Dawn (Chrysí Avgí), Greece.
5. National Democracy (Democracia Nacional), Spain.
6. Nation, Belgium.
7. Danish Party (Danskernes Parti), Denmark.

(I assumed already in September 2013 that Fiore was building an umbrella organisation that would unite political parties and movements that are generally more extreme than the Alliance of European National Movements. In February 2015, with the creation of the AFP, my assumption has been proven correct.)

The exact composition of the AFP delegation to the IRCF is unknown at the moment, but the following representatives seem to be confirmed: Nick Griffin, Roberto Fiore of the Forza Nuova, Udo Voigt of the NPD, Eleftherios Sinadinos and George Epitidios of the Golden Dawn.

The IRCF has almost a year-long history. It was first planned to be held on 15 March 2014, under the name "Russian National Forum against Tolerance", but due to the annexation of Crimea and the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the organisers decided to postpone the conference to 3-4 October (under the name "Russian National Forum"), then to 7-9 November 2014. Eventually, the organisers settled the final date: 22 March 2015, i.e. only one day instead of 2-3 days that they planned for October and November - this change apparently indicates the organisers failed to invite as many participants as they originally wanted.

The prospective participation of the FPÖ in the IRCF raises eyebrows. The FPÖ is clearly on the far right - it is a radical right-wing party - but all the other participants of the IRCF, including the Russian organiser (Rodina) are explicit fascists and neo-Nazis. Moreover, a number of European parties eventually refused to take part in this Russian fascist event, in particular the Swiss People's Party (Switzerland), Scottish National Party LOL, I guess the name fooled the inviters (UK), Identitarian Bloc (France), National Front (France), and Jobbik why? (Hungary). None of these parties wanted to fraternise with the European and Russian fascists.

What is behind the FPÖ's ideological promiscuity? I believe the answer is clear: the FPÖ is struggling to repeat the "success story" of the French Front National that has secured a multimillion loan from a Russian bank in 2014. To remind the readers, according the available information, these were former leaders of the Rodina party - namely Alexander Babakov and Dmitry Rogozin - who played a significant role in assisting Front National's Marine Le Pen in getting that multimillion loan. Hence, if the FPÖ wants the same, it now must obediently stooge for the Rodina party and the Kremlin. High rhetoric about sovereignty? Obviously not when the money is involved!

UPDATE:
According to the report from the ORF, the FPÖ has decided not to take part in the IRCF. Yuriy Lyubomirsky of the Rodina party says that, on Monday (9 March), he received an email from FPÖ's Johan Gudenus who cancelled his participation in the conference. Gudenus, at the same time, argues that he was not going to participate in the IRCF at all, but this seems highly unlikely. The organisers were planning to invite FPÖ already in January 2014, and Lyubomirsky confirmed, in December 2014, the participation of the FPÖ in the conference. This is the only reason why the organisers of the IRCF mentioned the party in the list of participating organisations on 4 March 2015:

http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.se...tria-will.html
 
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