Russian documents

[Alex Him]

Appendix

1) About removal of medals and badges of honor.

Major General Rooks takes note of the statement made by Colonel General Jodl and reports that the order to remove the medals and badges of honor has already been issued by the Allied command. The clauses of the Geneva Convention, cited by Colonel General Jodl, are valid for the belligerent countries, but in no way apply to surrendered troops for which the war is over.
He further said that he could briefly listen to the Colonel-General on the issue raised.
Colonel General Jodl:
He does not want to touch on the legal side of the issue, but stresses that the decision to take away from the German soldiers the awards won in hard battles will cause a "rebellion" and that the process of surrender, which has so far been going on without hindrance, can be harmed.
Major General Rooks:
Allied policy is to eradicate all National Socialist phenomena. And the order of the 21st British Army Group seeks exactly that goal.
Regarding Colonel General Jodl's remarks about the "rebellion", the German government must understand that the "rebellion" will be suppressed by all means of the Allies.









Colonel General Jodl:
The "rebellion" will not be organized by the high command, but every German officer will be ashamed to give the order to remove medals. If the allies, in spite of everything, want to carry out this order, all that remains is to tear off the medals and badges of honor by force. We are, of course, powerless to obstruct the execution of this order (he refers to the conduct of some English officer). The Russians, by the way, did not remove our medals and we also left all medals with the Allied prisoners of war.
Major General Rooks:
He, of course, understands Colonel General Jodl, but at the same time the German officers must explain to the soldiers that the order was given by the Allied command and must be carried out.
Colonel General Jodl:
When executing this order, one should distinguish between the emblem on the uniform and the cap and real medals. The removal of the emblem does not play any role, however, he, Colonel General Jodl, believes that after the removal of the medals and badges of honor, the swastika should also be removed, and this will take time.









Major General Rooks:
He first asked how long it would take for this, and, without waiting for an answer, continued that he would try to resolve this issue and would give an answer in the near future. Meanwhile, the orders of the 21st British Army Group must be carried out, since he, Major General Rooks, has no right to cancel them.






The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Novikova)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

May 20, 1945


Major General Dethleffsen



THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANDERSON, TO MAJOR GENERAL DETHLEFFSEN

1. The Commission asks to what extent the bombing affected the change in war plans and how did this affect the troops?

Almost all the time I was on the eastern front and therefore I cannot judge the results of the Anglo-American air raids.

2. How long have you been on the eastern front?

I was there from the beginning of hostilities until 1942, then, due to injury, I spent more than 1 year in Germany. From May 1943 to the end of February 1945 I was again at the front.

3. Was the withdrawal of German troops in 1943 according to plan, or was it forced, due to lack of materials and poor supply?

In the sector of the army to which I belonged /the Army Group "Center"/, the withdrawal took place in order to reduce the front line.









4. What were the consequences of the actions of the Russian aviation, which supported the Russian army at that time?

In 1943 Russian aviation did not cause us serious damage. Troops from the Smolensk region withdrew without heavy losses from the Russian aviation. Adequate cover was provided by German fighters. In 1943, there was little Russian aviation. In 1944, air operations were more significant. In 1945, Russian aviation was of decisive importance.

5. What types of Russian aviation operated at the front in 1943?

During the day, reconnaissance aircraft and single bombers operated, night fighters constantly operated at night, but I did not notice a specific system in the use of types of aviation.

6. Equipping the Russians with American aircraft of the P-39 and A-20 type, did these aircraft operate in 1943?

They were not in the central area. The first American aircraft appeared in the spring of 1944 /February/.

7. How were they used at the front and what was their impact on the German units?

In 1944, air operations were more tangible than in 1943.









7. How were they used at the front and what was their impact on the German units?

In 1944, air operations were more tangible than in 1943. At the same time, there was no significant difference between American and Russian aircraft in combat use and tactics.

8. Explain the growth of Russian aviation and its actions since 1944, attributing it to the fact that German aviation could not resist.

1st factor
German aviation on this front became weaker, since it had to be used to a greater extent on the western front.
2nd factor
The training of flight personnel and the quality of the material part of the Russians is higher than ours.

9. What were the main targets on which the Russian aviation strikes were concentrated?

The main targets were: military units of the first line; aviation operated in areas up to the location of their command posts. Less often, aviation operated on communications in the rear areas, never raided cities /the exception was from January 1945 the cities of East Prussia/.









10. To what extent did the Russian aviation influence the German supply?

Since there were rarely raids on communications and in the rear, aviation rarely interfered with the supply. While the battles were going on on Russian territory, obviously, the task was not set for aviation to interfere with the supply, because the partisans did this much more successfully than aviation.

11. Did the Russian aviation begin to operate on communications when the battles were not on Russian territory?

No.

12. How many Russian aircraft were operating at the front?

Since the intense battles of last autumn, 2-3 thousand aircraft have operated on the army front.

13. How many aircraft were required to successfully complete missions?

If the ground units did not fight, then aviation was used on a small scale, often only 20-30 aircraft flights were carried out at the front of the entire army /reconnaissance aircraft only/.









14. The goals for which the aviation operated?

During the day, these were targets located in the area from command posts to positions of divisional artillery. The purpose of the raids was to destroy the wire connection. During large battles, the targets of air raids were the infantry and artillery operating in the front line in firing positions.

15. Did the Russian aviation interfere with the supply of the forward units?

Non-systematic raids were carried out by single fighters with bombs.

16. What were the main goals of Russian aviation in East Prussia?

Forward edge, artillery, in addition, command posts, roads, settlements /the command post of the 4th army in one day was carried out 30 raids of fighter-bombers/.

17. What were the actions of aviation on command posts before a big offensive?

Communication was severely disrupted. The results of the raids depended on the degree of equipment and camouflage of a command post.









18. How successful were the actions of the Russian aviation aimed at the German troops of the first line in order to push them back?

Russian planes successfully attacked retreating troop columns moving in close combat formations /for example, in the summer of 1944 during the bombing of the army corps lost 3 generals within 24 hours/.

19. Did the Russian aviation contribute to the accomplishment of offensive missions?

In 1943, no. In 1944 its actions were successful in badly battered units. From the fall of 1944, aviation provided significant assistance in achieving success.

20. If in 1944 you had the same number of aircraft as the Russians, what types of aircraft would you choose? Tell us about your methods of using aircraft in combat in achieving possible successes.

We would use assault aircraft to raid Russian army columns moving in close battle formations.





to be continued in the next post...

[Alex Him]

21. To what extent was your army provided with automatic anti-aircraft guns?

If the enemy's offensive was detected in time, then from 4 to 5 anti-aircraft divisions were concentrated in the direction of the main attack. On quieter fronts, where a large offensive was not expected, anti-aircraft guns were used little, and sometimes they were not at all, since if the enemy infantry was inactive, then the air was calm.

22. Did you feel a shortage of anti-aircraft guns or were there enough?

We have always felt the need for anti-aircraft guns, because these guns are excellent anti-tank weapons.

23. Why didn't your plan include the use of more anti-aircraft guns?

I don't know.

24. What was the situation with the production of anti-aircraft guns and why couldn't you get more of them?

I dare not judge this.









25. How successfully were anti-aircraft guns used in the fight against Russian aviation?

At the beginning of the war, their use was more successful than at the end of the war.

26. How can you explain this?

Because lately, the numerical ratio of Russian aircraft to our anti-aircraft guns has not been in our favor and, in addition, the Russians have improved their flight tactics.

27. The Russians used a special type of aircraft that had a lot of weight with a load /it is covered with armor/. Do you know this type?

Yes.

28. Did you have enough ammunition?

In general, there were enough of them, but there were temporary interruptions due to the difficulties of transportation.

29. Was there a moment at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 when the supply of military equipment, ammunition, fuel, and so on on the eastern front was significantly reduced?

Yes, it was.









29. Was there a moment at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 when the supply of military equipment, ammunition, fuel, and so on on the eastern front was significantly reduced?

Yes, it was.

30. What were you most lacking?

In the autumn of 1944, we began to run out of fuel. By the time the allied invasion of France began, we were running out of ammunition.
I cannot determine to what extent the shortage of military equipment is due to a decrease in its production, its greater use on the western front and the difficulties arising from the withdrawal of units.

31. Did you feel a big shortage of fuel and also in cars during the withdrawal of units?

We have never felt a lack of cars.

32. How many armored divisions were active on the eastern front? And how many tanks did a division have?

In the central sector of the front /the 4th Army/ in the Smolensk area, from 2 to 4 tank divisions operated. The replenished tank division consisted of 80-120 tanks, including assault guns.






to be continued in the next post...

[Alex Him]

32. How many armored divisions were active on the eastern front? And how many tanks did a division have?

In the central sector of the front /the 4th Army/ in the Smolensk area, from 2 to 4 tank divisions operated. The replenished tank division consisted of 80-120 tanks, including assault guns.

33. Was it possible to compensate for the losses suffered by the tank divisions with new tanks, assault guns and personnel?

The losses were well compensated, which we did not even expect.

34. Were the tank divisions sufficiently supplied with fuel?

In general they were provided with fuel.
Since February 1945, the tank divisions began to suffer a shortage of fuel, because its delivery to East Prussia was carried out by sea.

35. Tank divisions were better supplied with fuel than other military units. By whom did they get more fuel?

They were in a privileged position with regard to the supply of fuel.
The fuel was saved on fronts where there was no fighting. The distribution of fuel in the army was done through the operations department for tactical reasons, and not through the quartermaster department.









36. To what extent did the Russians and Germans use artillery fire to support the infantry?

The artillery is the main weapon to support the infantry for us and for them. Over the past 2 years, Russian artillery has grown significantly and, moreover, has become more maneuverable.

37. What was the ratio of German artillery to Russian artillery?

During an offensive, the Russians concentrated up to 600 guns on the direction of the main attack for 1 kilometer. The ratio was 1:6.

38. What percentage of undamaged echelons of military equipment arrived on the Eastern front? What percentage were the losses from the bombing?

I cannot answer for sure. In my opinion, the losses of echelons from bombing on the Eastern Front were insignificant.

39. Was there any legal basis for the distribution of troops, people and military equipment between the Western and Eastern Fronts?

On the Eastern front, I was carrying out a task of the party, so from a practical point of view, I cannot answer this question.









40. Was Russian artillery successful in fighting German artillery?

In recent months, many German artillery units have been defeated by Russian artillery.

41. What tactics were used by the Russians in this?

In my opinion, they did not use any new "tactics", it is possible that they improved intelligence activities.

42. What type of artillery fire did the Russians use, low trajectory fire or high trajectory fire?

They used both types of artillery fire.

43. What facilitated to the catastrophe of the German troops on the Russian front?

The superiority of the Russians in the number of people, artillery, tanks and aircraft.

44. If Russian superiority facilitated to the catastrophe, why was the war started?

To characterize battles, it is not enough to judge only the number of troops. It is necessary to take into account the will of the people to resist and the moral strength of the people and troops. It is impossible to wage a war without taking this factor into account based only on calculations of the number of troops.

45. To what extent has aviation support for ground forces decreased? Did support decrease immediately or did it decrease gradually from the beginning to the end of the war?

I cannot judge the whole front.
After I returned to the front in mid-1943, the support of the ground forces by aviation was significantly weakened in comparison with 1941-1942. The support later fluctuated depending on the situation and again diminished slightly on the Eastern front by the time the Allies landed on the continent.









45. To what extent has aviation support for ground forces decreased? Did support decrease immediately or did it decrease gradually from the beginning to the end of the war?

I cannot judge the whole front.
After I returned to the front in mid-1943, the support of the ground forces by aviation was significantly weakened in comparison with 1941-1942. The support later fluctuated depending on the situation and again diminished slightly on the Eastern front by the time the Allies landed on the continent.

46. How often did German aircraft carry out raids on Russian troops?

The raids were carried out frequently and successfully, even with weak forces.



Distribution list:

To the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the high command of the armed forces.
To the deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the high command of the armed forces.
To the Demobilization Department.
To the Operations Department of the Air Force.





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Novikova)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

Flensburg - Mürwik
20.05.1945

The High Command of the Armed Forces.
The Operations Command Headquarters, The Operations Department (Ground Forces)
#1013/45



TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RUSSIAN CONTROL COMMISSION UNDER THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

In accordance with the instructions of Major General Trusov to Major General Dethleffsen of 20.05.1945, the high command of the armed forces intends to issue the attached order.
In connection with an order of the Allied Control Commission under the High Command of the Armed Forces to submit all issued orders for approval, a draft order is sent to the Allied Commission for consideration (in this appendix). In the event that Major General Rooks agrees with the content of this order, the high command of the armed forces will send it to the appropriate military units.


On behalf of:

Colonel General Jodl


Appendix




The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)









Translation from German

Headquarters - May 21, 1945
The top secret document
#142/45

The High Command of the Armed Forces.
The Operations Command Headquarters, The Operations Department (Ground Forces)


TO MILITARY COMMANDANTS OF FLENSBURG-Glücksburg

In connection with an instruction of the Russian control commission, the high command of the armed forces orders:

All Russian officers, non-commissioned officers and privates still at the German service levels located in the Flensburg and Flensburg-Mürwik garrisons or on German ships should be detained and sent on a ship to Flensburg.
It is necessary as soon as possible to report to the high command of the armed forces (the operations command headquarters), the data on the number of these persons, indicating the officers in particular.


On behalf of:

Colonel General Jodl





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

The Leading Minister of the Provisional Imperial Government

Flensburg
May 15, 1945


TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION UNDER THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL MAYOR ROOKS

Flensburg

Answering the questions proposed on 14.05.45 to Messrs Ricks and Emih, I have the honor to report the following:


1) The Provisional Imperial Government in Flensburg has the following ministries:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Ministry of Economy,
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forests,
Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
Ministry of Transport and Posts,
Ministry of Upbringing and Public Education,
Ministry of Justice.

The Grand Admiral is in charge of one military and one civilian cabinet.









2) The Prime Minister of the Provisional Imperial Government is Reich Minister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, who simultaneously heads the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance.

Other ministries are headed by:

Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Secretary of State - Dr Stuckart;
Ministry of Economy - Reich minister - Speer;
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forests - Reich minister - Backe;
Ministry of Labor and Social Security - Reich minister - Seldte;
Ministry of Transport and Posts - Reich minister - Dr Dorpmüller (currently he located in Malente, Eutin district);
Ministry of Upbringing and Public Education - the Secretary of State - Dr Stuckart;
Ministry of Justice - the post of minister is vacant (the duties of the minister are temporarily performed by Secretary of State Klemm).

The Civilian Cabinet of the Grand Admiral is led by Secretary of State Wegener. The Military Cabinet of the Grand Admiral is led by rear Admiral Wagner.









3) The ministries are in the process of being organized.
Currently, only a small number of officials are in the city of Flensburg, so it is not possible to give data on the organization of departments. Most of the officials of the former ministries are located in other cities in northern Germany. It would be desirable to collect them in Flensburg.
First of all, it is necessary to authorize the move to Flensburg for Reich Minister Dr Dorpmüller and the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Transport Dr Ganzenmüller (they are both in Malente), as well as the State Secretary of the Post Office, Wagel (he is in Hamburg).

Among the leading officials in the Imperial Provisional Government are:
The Secretary of State - Kritzinger,
Cabinet Counselor - von Stuttgerheim.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
The Secretary of State - Baron Steengracht von Moyland,
The junior secretary of state - Gencke,
The envoy - Sturre.

In the Ministry of Internal Affairs:
The Secretary of State - Dr Conti,
The head of department of the ministry - Dr Faust,
The head of department of the ministry - Dr Kropp,
The managing director of the Ministry - Jacobi.









There are currently no leading officials in the Ministry of Finance.

In the Ministry of Economy:
The head of department of the ministry - Ohlendorf.

In the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forests:
The Secretary of State - Rike,
The managing director of the Ministry - Dr Klausen.

There are currently no leading officials in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

In the Ministry of Upbringing and Public Education:
The Secretary of State - Zschintzsch.

In the Ministry of Justice:
The Secretary of State - Klemm.


4) All other ministries (the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of the War Economy and the War Industry, the Ministry of the Air Force and the Ministry of Occupied Regions) were disbanded. The affairs of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as before, are handled by the Ministry of Upbringing and Public Education.

5) There are no ministers without portfolios. Ministers who don't work with the Grand Admiral and in their own ministries are excluded from the government.









6) The Provisional Imperial Government in Flensburg in southern Germany does not have any ministries or ministers.
It has been many weeks since the former ministries in southern Germany set up working headquarters. We don't know whether the command authorities of the occupation forces established contact with them to solve economic problems.


On behalf of:

The Secretary of State
(the signature is illegible)





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

The High Command of the Armed Forces.
The Demobilization Department 1
#225/45

Headquarters - May 22, 1945


TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONTROL COMMISSION UNDER THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

On the issue: Registration of cases in the high command of the armed forces.

For the journal of military operations in the directorates and departments of the high command, copies were specially made from each important order or other document.
The journals of military operations were kept by specially assigned officers.
The completed journals of military operations were forwarded to the military archive in Potsdam, where they were kept. In addition, some cases were sent to the general archive from time to time.
The head of the archive was subordinate to Major General Scherff, who was also "the Fuehrer's commissioner to work on compiling the history of the war."
Recently, the military archive was located in Potsdam, then it was transported to Liegnitz. With the start of the Russian winter offensive in January 1945, part of the archive was sent to Potsdam, and another part to the southern region.









With the start of the Russian winter offensive in January 1945, part of the archive was sent to Potsdam, and another part to the southern region. It is likely that part of the archive was destroyed as a result of air raids.
Currently, more detailed data is not possible to give. Major General Scherff and Captain Scheidt, who are currently in the southern region, can provide information on this matter.


On behalf of:
(the signature is illegible)



Distribution list:

To the Demobilization Department 1 (a project)
To the head of the office (to a group of translators)





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

[Address of a minister of the "government" of Dönitz to the German people]

Translation from German

The High Command of the Armed Forces, on the orders of Grand Admiral Dönitz, announced today the unconditional surrender of all active troops.
As the leading Minister of the Imperial government, which commissioned the Grand Admiral to lead the cessation of hostilities, I address to the German people at this tragic moment in our history.
After almost six years of heroic struggle, unparalleled in tenacity, Germany's strength was exhausted. Continuing the war would only mean senseless bloodshed and unnecessary destruction.
The government with a sense of responsibility for the future of our people had to draw a conclusion from the collapse of all psychological and material forces and experience the hostility of the enemy. In the last phase of the war, which required terrible sacrifices, the main goal of the Grand Admiral and the government subordinate to him was to save as many German lives as possible. The fact that the war was not ended immediately and not simultaneously in the west and in the east is explained by this very goal.
At this tragic hour for the German people and state, we unite in a single reverent feeling for the victims of this war, who impose the highest obligations on us. We must turn our compassion and concern first of all to the wounded, homeless and all those affected by the war.









No one should be mistaken about the severity of the conditions that our opponents have imposed on the German people. No one should doubt that the coming time will be harsh for each of us and will require sacrifices in all areas of life. We must take them upon ourselves and loyally look at our obligations. We must take them upon ourselves and look with patience at our commitments.
However, we should also not be deluded by giving up everything and sacrificing everything. We must illuminate our path from darkness to the future with three stars, which have always been the basis of German existence. These stars are unity, legitimacy and freedom. Based on the experience of the past, we want to save and leave only one thing - unity, which during the war years was manifested in front-line comradeship and mutual assistance in misfortunes. Such qualities as comradeship and mutual assistance, practiced in the days of battles and air terror, will be necessary for us in the future in the face of coming hunger and poverty. Only by preserving this unity and avoiding disintegration into separate warring classes and groups, we will be able to survive the harsh time ahead.
We must put the rule of law in the basis of the life of our people. The justice must be the highest law and guiding principle for our people.
The rule of law should also underlie our relations with other peoples. Compliance with the terms of the concluded treaties should be as sacred as the feeling that our people are a member of the family of European nations.









Compliance with the terms of the concluded treaties should be as sacred as the feeling that our people are a member of the family of European nations.
We must exert all our physical, moral and material strength to heal the terrible wounds inflicted by the war.
We want to hope that the atmosphere of hatred with which Germany is surrounded today throughout the world will give way to reconciliation, without which the recovery of the world is impossible, and that freedom will come again for us, without which an acceptable and dignified existence is impossible for any people.
We look to the future of our people with confidence in their best forces, which have given the world unforgettable works of art and treasures.
The will of our people (one of the representatives of the Christian-European culture) is to make their contribution to the cause of peace, which corresponds to its best traditions.
Lord, don't leave us in misery and bless our hard work.





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

[On the legal status of Hitler's successor according to the German constitution.]

Translation from German

The Reichstag elected by the German people, according to the constitution, handed over to the Fuehrer all the fullness of state power. This power also provides for a clause on the appointment of a successor. In the past, the Fuehrer presented this issue to the Reichstag and the Reichstag approved the clause on the appointment of a successor by the Fuehrer. Thus, this right of the Fuhrer was recognized by the Reichstag and is in accordance with the German constitution.
A successor appointed by the Fuehrer, according to German state law and the constitution, has all the fullness of state power.
The Fuehrer appointed Grand Admiral Dönitz as his successor as Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Therefore, he cannot be recognized only as the supreme commander of the armed forces, and not recognized as the head of state.
Firstly, it is impossible to recognize the Fuehrer's decree on the successor only half, because it is a law.
Secondly, it is impossible to separate the concepts: the head of state and the supreme commander of the armed forces, because according to German state law and the constitution, a head of state is always at the same time a supreme commander of the armed forces. The performance of military functions is part of the duties of the head of state.









If the head of state resigns from himself, then at the same time he stops performing military functions, as the supreme commander of the armed forces. There cannot be such a situation that the head of state abdicated or was removed from his duties and, despite this, would remain the supreme commander of the armed forces.
The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces is a military adviser to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
He has no command power over the main parts of the armed forces /ground forces, air force, navy/ since they are subordinate to the respective commanders-in-chief, who in turn are subordinate to the supreme commander of the armed forces.
The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has no command power over the commanders-in-chief of the main parts of the armed forces.
The soldiers swore allegiance to the Fuehrer as supreme commander of the armed forces. After the appointment of the Grand Admiral as the successor to the Fuehrer, the oath immediately passes to him. If the Grand Admiral does not remain the supreme commander of the armed forces, then the soldiers will be free from the oath, because they are not bound by the oath either in relation to the chief of the main staff of the high command of the armed forces, or in relation to the commanders-in-chief of the main parts of the armed forces.





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

The High Command of the Armed Forces.
The Chief of Staff of Operations Management.
1/45

May 22, 1945

To General Trusov, Chairman of the Russian Control Commission under the High Command of the German Armed Forces.
A short list of the reasons why the High Command of the German Armed Forces cannot provide comprehensive complete data:
1/ Some units of the high command of the armed forces in the fall of 1944 were evacuated from Berlin and distributed in various regions of the state.
2/ In the first days of January 1945, the headquarters of the operational leadership and the general headquarters of the ground forces in Berlin were united, but they continued to work separately geographically.
3/ After the course of events suggested that Germany would be cut in its central part, it became necessary to decide where the high command would continue its work - in the northern or southern regions of Germany.
The final decision of the Fuhrer on this issue was difficult to find out. In the headquarters of the operational leadership and in the general headquarters, measures were taken to provide leadership in both parts of the state. And only at the moment when it became possible to move to the south only by car or by rail, the Fuehrer gave the order to go to the southern part.









And only at the moment when it became possible to move to the south only by car or by rail, the Fuehrer gave the order to go to the southern part.
As a result, most of the officers of the high command of the armed forces and all the archives, especially about the past, were evacuated to the south. Only a small operational group of the headquarters of the operational leadership and the general headquarters of the ground forces and the most necessary documents remained in Berlin. But this group was also preparing for the evacuation to the southern regions of Germany with the help of transport aircraft.
22.04.45, the Fuhrer finally decided not to leave Berlin, but personally to direct its defense. Together with him, a number of officers remained in Berlin, including the former deputy chief of the general staff, General Krebs.
The chief of staff of the high command of the armed forces received from the Fuehrer the task of preventing the complete encirclement of Berlin by turning the western front and personally directing this operation.
The operational group of the general headquarters of the ground forces was attached to the headquarters of the operational leadership and subordinated to me. From that day on, Field Marshal Keitel became the head of the joint groups of the headquarters of the operational leadership and the general headquarters of the ground forces and directed the operations of the 12th Army /Wenck/ and the "Vistula" Army Group at the instructions of the Reich Chancellery, transmitted by telephone or radio. In view of this, we were positioned so close to the front line that as a result of night marches in separate groups we barely managed to get away from the Russian tank vanguards.









In view of this, we were positioned so close to the front line that as a result of night marches in separate groups we barely managed to get away from the Russian tank vanguards.
The last move from Plön to Mürwik also took place in conditions of persecution, so the headquarters of the high command arrived in Mürwik unorganized and almost without the necessary documents.
These circumstances determine the impossibility /with all our desire/ to provide full information on the issues proposed by the Allied control commissions. However, this would have been possible with the reunification of the officers from the southern and northern regions.
The appendix provides a diagram of the organization of the high command of the armed forces in wartime, which provides for:
a/ The organization of the high command before the Fuehrer became commander-in-chief of the ground forces;
b/ The organization of the high command after the Fuehrer became commander-in-chief of the ground forces.


Signature: Jodl





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)









The organization of the High Command of the German Armed Forces

a) Before December 1941

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The headquarters of the operational leadership:

- Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces with the general headquarters of the ground forces

- Commander-in-Chief of the Navy with the general headquarters

- Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force with the general headquarters



b) After December 1941

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, at the same time Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces:

- The headquarters of the operational leadership for the management of operations in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Africa, the Balkans, including Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia

- The general headquarters of the ground forces for the management of operations on the Eastern Front



Signature: Jodl

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

The High Command of the Armed Forces.
The Demobilization Department.
#224/45

Headquarters - May 22, 1945


To the Chairman of the Control Comission under the High Command of the Armed Forces.


THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES until May 10, 1945

1/ The Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces were subordinated to:

the central directorate
the headquarters of the operational leadership
the general affairs department
the picking department
the military economy department
the head of road transport service
the commander of the maintenance of order forces
the head of the military transport service
the law department
the financial department
the special headquarters for the conduct of economic warfare
the chief of the headquarters of the ground forces









1st General for Special Assignments - General of the Infantry Thomas /work on the history of the war economy/
2nd General for Special Assignments - General of Artillery von Boetticher /processing of foreign press reports for the report to the Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces on the intentions of the Allies/
3rd General for Special Assignments - General of the Infantry Glaise von Horstenau /work on the history of the south-east/
4th General for Special Assignments - General of the Infantry Erfurt /work on the study of the Finnish war/

Liaison officers with the General Commissioners for the management of work:
the head of work with Hitler youth,
the Reich Minister for War Industry and Economics /The president Kerrl/,
the Chief of Staff of the SA [Sturmabteilung].


2/ The chief of the headquarters of the operational leadership were subordinated to:

the deputy chief of the headquarters of the operational leadership,
the head of the department for the management of personal affairs of officers,
the headquarters commandant,
the operations department /of ground forces/,









the operations department /of Air force/,
the operations department /of Navy/,
the department of quartermaster,
the organizational department,
the military counterintelligence department,
the intelligence department,
the military propaganda department,
the head of communications service,
the department for the study of foreign armies.

/The data are given from my memory, as there are no written materials./


On behalf of:
(the signature is illegible)



Distribution list:

To the Demobilization Department 1 (a project)
To the head of the office (to a group of translators)





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Bazhenov)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)









Radio and telephone communication scheme as of 19.05.1945 - At 10 o'clock

The Army Group Lindemann
The Army Group Müller

The Army Group Blumentritt
The Army Group Narvik

25th Army
The Army Group "North"
20th Mountain Army

The general quartermaster [written vertically]

The Liaison Headquarters with Montgomery
British Commission
The High Command of the Armed Forces
The Liaison Headquarters with Zhukov

Reims
The Liaison Headquarters with Eisenhower

The High command of the armed forces of the southern group
The Army Group "Austria"

6th Army Group (USA)
The Army Group "West"
The headquarters of Klasing (a chief quartermaster of army group "Austria")

only receiving messages [written at an angle]

1st army
The army group "G"
The chief quartermaster of the army group "South-West"
The Army Group "South-West"
The Army Group "South-East"

2nd Panzer Army
14th army
10th army

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

Headquarters - 09.05.1945

The headquarters of the operational leadership
The operations department /of Air Force/

In 5 copies
4th copy.


Field Marshal Keitel's conversation with Colonel General Serov 08.05.1945 in Berlin, after the surrender of the German army.

After the surrender of the German army on 08.05.1945 at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel General Serov, senior quartermaster of Marshal Zhukov, visited a house provided to the German delegation, accompanied by his translator, Colonel Korotkov, to raise a number of significant questions. On behalf of whom he visited us, it was difficult to understand. However, it can be assumed that on behalf of Marshal Zhukov, despite the assurances at the beginning and end of the conversation that he came to us with "personal motives."
First, Colonel-General Serov raised a question of the German delegation's unwillingness to talk about additions to the terms of surrender.
He expressed a desire to immediately notify from Berlin the army about the additions, to which the field marshal replied that this was impossible due to the lack of communication. This gave Colonel-General Serov a reason to make a remark that a communications officer, a general with a radio station, should be immediately attached to the Russian command in Berlin.









This gave Colonel-General Serov a reason to make a remark that a communications officer, a general with a radio station, should be immediately attached to the Russian command in Berlin. The field marshal agreed with this remark and began its implementation by instructing a General Staff officer in the afternoon of 09.05.45 to transfer to a plane all maps and diagrams for the organization of units operating on the Eastern front, as well as lists of command personnel, requested by Colonel General Serov. The next day, 10.05.45, a German communications headquarters was attached to the colonel-general to resolve all emerging issues.
The Colonel General's next question concerned the headquarters of the field marshal, and in this regard, the grand admiral. He believed that the Grand Admiral and his staff should be "legalized", but Flensburg was not suitable for this. He stated that it is planned to move the headquarters to the center of Germany, in order to establish and constantly maintain contact with the allies. The field marshal also plans to move the headquarters.
In the opinion of the colonel-general, the gross admiral with his staff, along with purely military issues, should also deal with civil matters in order to resolve all problems arising from the signed unconditional surrender.
The Colonel General's next question was about the Grand Admiral. He asked, what is Gross Admiral Dönitz? This question was asked deliberately, for it is not clear to the Soviet command who appointed the Grand Admiral as head of state. The Field Marshal explained that the Grand Admiral was appointed by the Fuehrer on the basis of the constitution. The Fuehrer himself appointed his successor.









To the colonel-general's remark that the German army was still under oath to the Fuhrer, the field marshal replied that the oath had automatically passed to the grand admiral.
Further, the colonel-general asked if the Fuhrer really died, since he did not leave a will and his corpse was not found? The Soviet command had understandable doubts about the actual death of the Fuhrer, and it assumes that the Fuhrer continues to rule the country, hiding in the shadows of this head of government. The Field Marshal denied these assumptions and assured everyone of the death of the Fuhrer.
In addition, the Colonel General wanted to know if Reichsminister Goebbels had really died and what the Field Marshal knew on this matter? At the same time, the colonel general asked first of all, which leg of Minister Goebbels was abnormally developed? The field marshal could not give an exact answer, which greatly surprised the colonel-general, for in his opinion, such things should be known when you see a person every day.
The Colonel General saw a gold party badge on the field marshal's uniform and was surprised that the field marshal was a member of the party, he believed that such wearing of the badge seemed to be prohibited. The Field Marshal explained to the Colonel General that some senior officers had been awarded the gold party badge and that the awarding of the gold party badge was tantamount to being awarded the order.
Also Colonel General asked if Himmler was alive? To this the field marshal replied that Himmler had disappeared in an unknown direction.









To this the field marshal replied that Himmler had disappeared in an unknown direction.
The Colonel General ended the conversation with the following question: "How do you view the present situation in Germany and what are its prospects for the future?"
The field marshal did not want to answer such a difficult question in detail, since this would require several conversations. But he briefly replied that the people of Germany are unified, they should be and will be so.
The field marshal ended the conversation with a request not to give interviews in public circles about the meeting and stressed that this was just a conversation between two senior officers, which should not be brought to the attention of other people.



Distribution list:

1/ To the Grand Admiral - 1st copy
2/ To the Chief of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces - 3rd copy
3/ To the Chief of the General headquarters of the Armed Forces - 2nd copy
4/ To the Admiral Bürkner - 4th copy
5/ To the operations department /of Air Force/ - 5th copy





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Novikova)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)

[Alex Him]

Translation from German

Flensburg - Mürwik
16.05.1945

The Lieutenant Colonel of the General headquarters de Maizière

The High Command of the Armed Forces /the headquarters of the operational leadership/
The operations department /of the ground forces/


REPORT
about a trip to the headquarters of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.


1/ The distribution of time:

12.05.45 - in the morning - Flight by English plane from Flensburg to Tempelhof. Here a short rest and then a trip to Berlin - Köpenick /Wendenschloss district/ to the headquarters of Marshal Zhukov.

15:30 - Transfer of the brought operational and organizational documents of the German High Command for the Eastern Front to the Deputy Chief of Staff.

13.05.45-16.05.45 - Stay at the headquarters of Marshal Zhukov.

16.05.45 - afternoon - Return flight on a Russian plane from the Krummensee airfield /Werneuchen district/ to Flensburg.


2/ The treatment.

The treatment with me was exceptionally courteous. Only one question was deliberately posed to me in a defiant manner. The apartment, food and other services were excellent. All my wishes, such as the request for Russian newspapers, books and cigarettes, were immediately granted. Only one of my requests /the provision of a radio apparatus/ remained unfulfilled.









The apartment /a small villa with a garden/ was not allowed to be left, but there was no special security.


3/ The Conversations.

In addition to handing over the brought documents directly to the deputy chief of staff, until 15.05.45 every day in my apartment I met to talk with an officer-translator /a captain/.
The questions put to me concerned minor explanations to the brought documents, for example: explanations of abbreviations and so on.
For my part, I suggested dropping leaflets about the cessation of hostilities over the protectorate, and also asked for a privileged treatment of officers and soldiers of the Courland group and support for the proposal to reunite certain units of the high command of the armed forces.
At the same time, I asked when Matsky's headquarters would be recalled? I also informed about my proposed replacement by Lieutenant Colonel of the General headquarters Sieber.
In addition, I gave a daily radiogram to the chief of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces with a request to transfer me to a new duty station. However, all the questions I raised remained unanswered. My radio messages, as it turned out later, were not sent.
On 16.05.45 in the afternoon I was visited by a Russian general, accompanied by a lieutenant colonel and an officer-translator.









On 16.05.45 in the afternoon I was visited by a Russian general, accompanied by a lieutenant colonel and an officer-translator. For two hours, he questioned me in detail about the origin and location of the Zossen camp, the organization of the general headquarters of the ground forces and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, as well as the organization and methods of work of the operational department of the general headquarters of the ground forces. At the same time, I was asked questions with the analysis of the smallest details.
At 14 o'clock, a Russian colonel visited me and said that Marshal Zhukov considered my mission completed and that he /the colonel/ was instructed to accompany me to the airfield, from where I was supposed to fly back to Flensburg.


4/ Remarks.

Despite the questions I repeatedly asked about the names of the generals with whom I spoke, I received no answers.
The exact knowledge of the names of our officers of the main command of the ground forces by the translator who conducted my survey was striking.
I was asked several times about the whereabouts of my relatives. Repeated questions were also raised about the whereabouts of the SS Reichsfuehrer and the SS command.

The Lieutenant Colonel of the General headquarters de Maizière









Distribution list:

To the adjutants of the Grand Admiral,
To the liaison officer of the imperial government,
To the Foreign Intelligence Department,
To the Chief of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces,
To the Deputy Chief of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces,
To the demobilization department,
To the Chief of the operational department /of the ground forces/,
To the Foreign Information Department,
Several spare copies.





The text was translated by:

a lieutenant - (Novikova)




Everything written here is right:

The Head of the 1st Subdivision of 4th Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

a lieutenant colonel - (Korbut)









THE CONFIMATION SHEET

In this case #63, folder 06, 106 sheets are numbered;
plus 1 sheet of internal inventory;
plus 1 usage sheet.

A state of the case (what are the defects), peculiarities of sheet numbering._______

October 10, 1975

Performed by inspector O. A. Grigoriev.
Checked by senior assistant N. Ya. Bolsheva.

Subsequent changes in the composition and state of the case (the date, position and signature are indicated at the end of the record)_______






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In the end, I completed the translation of this case from the section "Molotov's Secretariat"

By the way, this was only one of 2268 cases from this section

But I don't promise you so far that I will translate them all for you